From an article written by Tom Eley. I had tried to write a response to the idea of a “team of rivals”, but I could never find the right words to what I was seeing in Obama’s picks for his cabinet. Now thanks to Eley I do not need to give myself a headache.
In recent weeks, numerous media accounts have referred to President-elect Barack Obama’s cabinet selections as a “team of rivals.” The reference is to a book of the same name by the historian Doris Kearns Goodwin on Abraham Lincoln’s choices for key cabinet posts after his victory in the 1860 election, when he confronted the secession crisis and then the Civil War.
The media comparisons between Lincoln’s and Obama’s cabinets are specious, betraying a combination of historical ignorance and political shallowness. The false analogy serves two political functions. First, it implicitly imparts to Obama a progressive and democratic aura which is, in fact, belied by his cabinet selections, all of whom are advocates of militarism abroad and austerity at home. Second, the analogy distorts and demeans the historically progressive character of Lincoln and his government, which embodied a profoundly democratic and ultimately revolutionary agenda, centered on the struggle against slavery and the preservation of the union.
The use of the term “team of rivals” in relation to the Obama cabinet rests on the president-elect’s selection for secretary of state of his chief opponent for the Democratic presidential nomination, Hillary Clinton, and his retention from the Bush administration of Robert Gates for defense secretary. Obama won the nomination over Clinton, who was the early favorite, by appealing to broad opposition to the war in Iraq among Democratic voters and the population at large, incessantly reminding voters that “she got it wrong” in her support for the invasion and presenting himself as the candidate who would bring a rapid end to the war. He then won the general election based on a powerful voter repudiation of the Bush administration’s militaristic foreign policy and its pro-corporate and anti-democratic domestic agenda.
This is not only not analogous to Lincoln’s approach, it is the opposite. Lincoln’s key cabinet picks, while they had been rivals for the Republican Party nomination of 1860, in no way represented a retreat from the central principals of his campaign and the aspirations of his voters: preserving the union and preventing the expansion of slavery. These appointments included William Seward as secretary of state, Salmon Chase as treasury secretary, and Edward Bates as attorney general.
Lincoln rose to prominence in the young Republican Party by giving political voice to mass popular sentiment against the expansion of slavery to the new states and territories of the West. Largely because of his genius for clearly presenting the critical political issues related to slavery, he bested more prominent politicians such as Seward (senator from New York) and Chase (governor of Ohio) in the contest for the 1860 Republican presidential nomination. But despite numerous political and personal differences, Seward, Chase and all of Lincoln’s other cabinet selections shared the central aim of the Republican Party—preserving the union and defeating the rebellion of the Southern slave owners.
In securing the 1860 Republican nomination, Lincoln beat out his main rivals, Seward, Chase and Bates. Then, after winning the general election, he invited them to assume key cabinet posts. He did so not simply because he was a shrewd politician, but because he wished to unite the various sections of the Republican Party behind the aspirations of genuinely democratic forces in the country and create the best possible conditions for crushing the Southern planters’ rebellion.
Please stop using the analogy…it simply is not true.