A deep-seated global crisis is often a chance to redraw the map, reflecting shifts in the balance of power in different ways.
First, the crisis can confirm or nudge ahead trends which seem to be happening anyway – like the shift of power from Western to emerging Eastern players.
Second, it can put flesh on reforms already in the air – like plans to overhaul the international financial architecture to be discussed at this weekend’s summit being hosted by President Bush in Washington.
And third, there are the instinctive emergency reactions, supposedly temporary, but which can end up reshaping the global chessboard for years to come – the hurried nationalisation of some Western banks, for instance, or possibly Iceland’s desperate bailout appeal to Russia – a Nato member putting financial survival ahead of any security provisos.
China and India have been less affected. And, even if demand for Chinese goods slows, its mammoth economy can still be a powerful engine of growth and a much needed source of liquidity.
Look no further than Moscow, where the stock market panic and flight of capital abroad have been dramatic, and the fall in world oil prices has added to the economy’s battering.
Despite Russia’s legendary energy wealth, there is a new nervous uncertainty among local businessmen who – one suspects – know more than most about the way the domestic economy remains weakened by corruption and a labyrinthine smoke-and-mirrors way of doing business.
The World Bank and the IMF, the hard bargaining will revolve not just around which new countries get seats on the board, but whether they will be allowed to upset the current balance of power when it comes to decision-making. Note that already there are voices warning that too many players will make any new arrangement dysfunctional.
There are other complications. Russia continues to agitate for any adjustment that will lessen US influence, whether in financial or European security matters.
The world economy is as about as fragile as the US, one good push and it will topple.